Coalitions and alliances are ubiquitous in humans and many other mammals, being part of the fabric 27 of complex social systems. Field biologists and ethologists have accumulated a vast amount of data 28 on coalition and alliance formation, while theoretical biologists have developed modeling 29 approaches. With the accumulation of empirical data and sophisticated theory, we are now 30 potentially able to answer a host of questions about how coalitions emerge and are maintained in a 31 population over time, and how the psychology of this type of cooperation evolved. Progress can only 32 be achieved, however, by effectively bridging the communication gap that currently exists between 33 empiricists and theoreticians. In this paper, we aim to do so by asking three questions: (1) formation that is testable under real-world conditions. 42
Ideally, theory and empirical data should build on each other in a series of mutually reinforcing 46 cycles, generating ever more powerful predictive models that could be tested empirically under a 47 wide range of laboratory and field conditions. The greater precision of our models, and the more 48 focused data sets that would then accumulate, would enable us to identify the key elements 49 underlying a particular behavioral phenomenon. This ideal is rarely met, however, and theoreticians 50 and empirical scientists all too often talk past one another. Part of the reason is a difference in the 51 generality of issues under study: many animal behavior researchers stay close to the empirical 52 material they gather, often focusing on just one or two groups of animals for practical reasons, while 53 asking quite specific questions regarding the observed patterns. In contrast, theoreticians often use 54 formal description to arrive at more general underlying principles of a given phenomenon that can be 55 broadly applied across a variety of taxa and social systems. They do not generally formulate their 56 models in a way that facilitates empirical investigation via precise operationalization. 57
Here we consider the case of coalition formation, an active area of research that seems ready for 58 mathematical modeling. Naturalistic observations are crucial for documenting its distribution across 59 taxa, the variety of forms it takes, the function it serves, and the degree of cognitive complexity it 60 requires. As we will discuss, however, the complexity of the patterns and processes revealed by 61 these naturalistic studies demonstrates the need for a formal theoretical framework to fully 62 understand the evolution and maintenance of coalition formation across the animal kingdom. There 63 is currently a whole suite of modeling approaches available to address such fundamental questions 64 as: Why do some species commonly form coalitions whereas others do not? What are the potential 65 fitness consequences of not participating in all possible coalition opportunities? Can apparently 66 "cognitively complex" coalitionary behavior emerge from simple behavioral rules? Unfortunately, as 67 noted above, the exchange of ideas between empiricists and theoreticians is often hindered by their 68 different goals, background, and use of terminology (Mesterton-Gibbons et al., 2010). Here, wethe long-term goal of achieving a more comprehensive theory of coalition formation. 71
We start by briefly describing patterns of coalition formation within and across species. We next 72 summarize the primary questions addressed by theoreticians, and identify the main building blocks 73 of their models. Then we selectively review the literature on coalition formation with the explicit aim 74 of contrasting empirical data with the assumptions made by theoretical models, pinpointing where 75 these might be overly simplistic, and identifying important parameters that have been poorly 76 quantified in the field. As the literature in this area remains heavily skewed toward the primates 77 and understanding this diversity would be greatly enhanced by formal modeling that would allow us 173 to identify the general conditions under which coalition formation is expected to evolve, characterize 174 the degree of variability expected, and predict when coalitions should, and should not, occur. Below, 175
we summarize existing modeling approaches and highlight their main findings and predictions to 176 date. 177
Modeling coalitions and alliances 178

General theoretical perspectives 179
There exist four major mathematical theories that can provide insight into how coalitions Table 1 . 227
Fitness maximization 228
An overwhelming majority of coalitionary models focuses on determining which of a possible set of 229 coalitionary strategies maximizes individual fitness, given specific assumptions about the costs and 230 benefits to individuals, as well as the group composition and the information available to individuals. 231
Typically these models involve only three individuals. One of the oldest models is the one of 232 "minimally winning coalitions" of Riker (1962) arguments and further suggested that the transition required a change in cognitive abilities. Gavriletsheuristic rule that utilized the relative "affinities" of a potential helper to the two individuals engaged 296 in conflict. These "affinities" reflected the history of past interactions and changed via a process akin 297 to reinforcement learning: that is, they increased following a mutually beneficial interaction and 298 decreased following an agonistic interaction. Affinities also continuously decayed to zero reflecting a 299 loss of memory by the helpers and actors (or alternatively, the discounting of distant events in the 300 past). Affinities thus represent a simple alternative to explicit fitness considerations. is that they are scalable, i.e. they can easily be generalized to larger groups and multiple coalitions. 303
Of course this would require individuals to be able to memorize a larger number of affinities. One 304 serious limitation to this approach must also be emphasized, however: there is no guarantee that the 305 heuristic rules used in this and similar models are evolutionarily stable. Consequently, the 306 "coalitionary psychology" postulated in these models is, potentially, biologically irrelevant. This is 307
clearly an area on which empirical research can shed more light by testing which decision rules are 308 used in coalitionary conflicts. 309
Evolution of behavioral rules and its consequences 310
Analysis of evolutionarily stable strategies has been an extremely important tool in theoretical 311 studies of animal behavior (Maynard Smith, 1982) . There are, however, only a few models that 312 explicitly study the emergence of evolutionarily stable behavioral rules in a coalitionary context (thus 313 combining the two approaches outlined above). These models make specific assumptions with 314 respect to possible coalitionary strategies, their costs and benefits, the information available to 315 individuals, and the behavioral rules followed by individuals. Mesterton-Gibbons and Sherratt 316 is the assumption that individuals differ with respect to a genetically controlled trait ("alliance 319 threshold") that determines whether an individual seeks coalitionary aid (if his strength falls below
